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Abstract
Rˆ ole-based access control (RBAC) is increasingly at-
tracting attention because it reduces the complexity and
cost of security administration by interposing the notion of
rˆ ole inthe assignmentof permissions to users. In this paper,
we present a formal framework relying on an extension of
the π calculus to study the behavior of concurrent systems
in a RBAC scenario. We deﬁne a type system ensuring that
the speciﬁed policy is respected during computations,and a
bisimulation to equate systems. The theory is then applied
to three meaningful examples, namely ﬁnding the ‘minimal’
policy to run a given system, reﬁning a system to be run
under a given policy (whenever possible), and minimizing
the number of users in a given system without changing the
overall behavior.
Introduction
Rˆ ole-based access control (RBAC) [6, 17] has recently
emerged as a widely accepted alternative to classical dis-
cretionaryand mandatoryaccesscontrols: a standardis cur-
rently under development by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) [7] and several commercial
applications directly support some forms of RBAC, e.g.,
Oracle, Informix and Sybase in the ﬁeld of commercial
database management systems.
RBAC is a ﬂexible and policy-neutral access control
technology: it regulates the access of users to information
and system resources on the basis of activities they need
to execute in the system. The essence of RBAC lies with
the notions of user, rˆ ole and permission: users are autho-
rized to use the permissions assigned to the rˆ oles they be-
long to. More speciﬁcally, RBAC allows for a preliminary
assignment of permissions to rˆ oles (thus abstracting from
which users will play the various rˆ oles at run-time). A user
may then establish multiple sessions, e.g., by signing on to
the system, during which he activates a subset of rˆ oles that
he is a member of. This greatly simpliﬁes system manage-
ment, as it reduces the cost of administering access control
policies, as well as making the administration process less
error-prone. Anyway, the complexityof the models (e.g., in
large systems the number of rˆ oles can exceed hundreds or
thousands) demands a structured approach to the analysis
and design of such systems.
This paper aims at developing a foundational theory for
system behaviors in a RBAC scenario; to the best of our
knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt in this direction. Our ref-
erence model is the so-called RBAC96 model, introduced
by Sandhu et al. in the seminal paper [17]. More advanced
RBAC models include rˆ ole hierarchies and constraints such
as rˆ ole mutual exclusion, separation of duty, delegation of
authority and negative permissions. Our starting point is
the π calculus [18], which provides very well-established
mathematical tools for expressing concurrent and possibly
distributed systems. Essentially, our idea is to equip the π
calculus with a notion of users (i.e., named processes), with
two new constructs for activation/deactivation of rˆ oles, and
with a way to grant permissions to rˆ oles. This is accounted
for by associating each process with a name representing a
user and with a set ρ recording the rˆ oles activated by the
user during the currentsession. Hence, the term r{| P|}ρ rep-
resents a session of the user named r, running a process P
with active rˆ oles ρ. The calculus is completed by two con-
structs to model rˆ ole’s activation/deactivation, deﬁned by
the following reductions:
r{| roleR.P|} ρ  −→ r{| P|}ρ∪{R}
r{| yieldR.P|} ρ  −→ r{| P|}ρ−{R}
Intuitively, when a user r activates a rˆ ole R during a ses-
sion, R must be added to the set of activated rˆ oles ρ,a n dt h e
remaining of the session P will be executed with the set ρ
updated. Vice versa for the deactivation of R.
As an example, the following system
client{| roleauth client.port 80 index.html .P|} ρ
  server{| port 80(x).Q|} ρ 
models the interaction between a client and a HTTP server.
Thesystemcontainstwousers, client and server, runningin
parallel. It mayevolveas follows. First, userclient activates
the rˆ ole auth client by exercising the roleaction, which
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of a secure certiﬁcate. Then, she sends the request to the
HTTP server to the usual port 80, i.e., performs an output
action on the channel port 80.
The introduction of named users immediately suggests
the idea of a distributed system. In such systems, as e.g.
the Internet, the notion of global, non-located channels as
port 80 is quite an abstraction over what is realistically
achievable. We therefore use a notion of localized channels
` al aDπ [10], where each channel is associated to a single
user. Syntactically, we realize this feature by taggingoutput
actions to specify the user (or location) where the exchange
is supposed to take place. Thus the example above may be
rewritten as:
client{| roleauth client.port 80server index.html .P|} ρ
  server{| port 80(x).Q|} ρ 
We also allow user names to be exchanged during com-
munications. This feature adds ﬂexibility and realism to
the language, since in distributed systems users have only
a partial and evolving knowledge of their execution envi-
ronment. For example, the client above can be generalized
to leave the server identity unspeciﬁed and to dynamically
retrieve it with an input from channel choose a server:
client{| roleauth client.choose a server(x)
.port 80x index.html .P|} ρ
Moredetails onourcalculus, togetherwith some illustrative
examples, will be given in Section 1.
The mappingamongusers, rˆ oles and permissions, which
controls the access of subjects to objects, is achieved by a
pair of relations (U;P), called RBAC schema.I n( U;P),
relation U is the association users-to-rˆ oles, while P is the
association permissions-to-rˆ oles. As a ﬁrst contribution of
this paper, we deﬁne in Section 2 a type system which
complements the dynamics of the calculus by providing
static guarantees that systems not respecting a given RBAC
schema are rejected. In the client/server example above,
a client not authenticated (i.e. interacting with the server
without having previously performed a roleauth client)
would be rejected, if the RBAC schema enables only autho-
rized users to perform HTTP requests.
Often, the overall structure of a distributed system can-
notbeknownstatically. Thus, a typingapproachmaynotbe
usable in practice. What is needed is a technique to study
system components in isolation, compositionally, and un-
der diﬀerent schemata. Hence, as a second contribution, in
Section 3 we introduce a labeled transition system to give a
structured operational semantics to programs, and account
for the dynamic checks necessary to enforce RBAC poli-
cies. Such labeled transition system yields a bisimulation
equivalence, adequate with respect to a standardly deﬁned
(typed) barbed congruence, that allows us to prove some
C: ar,bs,... ∈C= Nc ×N u
I: u,v,... ∈N u ∪V∪C∪(Nc ×V )
V: m,n,... ∈N u ∪C
P: P,Q ::= nil
   P | Q
   !P
   [u = v]P
   (νa:R)P
   a(x).P
   u v .P
   roleR.P
   yieldR.P
S: A, B ::= 0
   r{| P|}ρ
   A   B
   (νar:R)A
Table 1. Syntax of the Calculus
interesting algebraic laws. As an example, we show how
RBAC schemata may change the semantic theory of the π
calculus. Consider the following system, adapted from the
client/server example above:
(νport 80server:R)(server{| port 80(x).Q|} ρ 
  client{| port 80server index.html .P|} ∅)
where (νport 80server:R) is the standard restriction operator
of a typed π calculus (it declares port 80server at type R and
limits the visibility of the channel to client andserver only).
By resuming the assumption that only authorized users can
perform HTTP requests, the above system is blocked, i.e. it
is equivalent to the empty system 0, because the client has
not been authenticated. On the contrary, in the π calculus a
similar term would have been equivalent to the term result-
ing from the client/server exchange.
In Section 4 we use types and bisimulations to deal with
three meaningful examples: ﬁnding the ‘minimal’ RBAC
schema to execute a system, reﬁning a system to be well-
typed with respect to a given schema (whenever possible),
and minimizingthe numberof users in a givensystem with-
out changing the overall behaviour. We conclude by com-
paring our approach with related work in Section 5. In this
extended abstract all proofs are omitted, as is much of the
discussion; complete proofs can be found in [3].
1 The Language
In this section we introduce our calculus formally. First,
we deﬁne syntax and operational semantics; then, we for-
malize the RBAC schema to describe the rˆ oles-to-users and
permissions-to-rˆ oles assignment.
1.1 Syntax
The calculus is a conservative extension of the π calcu-
lus. We assume the following countable and pairwise dis-
joint sets: R of rˆ ole names, ranged over by R,S,...; Nu of
user names, ranged over by r, s,...; Nc of channel names,
ranged over by a,b,... ;a n dV of variables, ranged over
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with restricted channels decorated with a rˆ ole as described
in Section 1.3.
A systemconsistsoftheparallelcompositionofuserses-
sions that can share channels. A user session r{| P|}ρ rep-
resents a user named r executing session P with the set ρ
recordingr’s active rˆ oles. Observe that diﬀerentsessions of
the same user can run in parallel within a system A:t h i si s
the usual notion of sessions in RBAC models.
Processes nil, P | Q,! P,[ u = v]P,( νa : R)P, a(x).P,
u v .P are the ordinary π-like constructs representing re-
spectively the inactive process, parallel composition of pro-
cesses, replication (to model recursive process behaviors),
value matching, restriction of channel names and standard
input/output actions over channels. (As usual, in the rest of
thepaperwe will omittrailinginactiveprocesses.) Thenov-
elty of the calculus resides in the actions roleR and yieldR,
and in the locality of channels, as already described in the
Introduction. Actions roleR and yieldR implement activa-
tions/deactivations of rˆ oles in the user session they belong
to, and modify the session rˆ oles accordingly.
Channels are uniquely associated to users. The set of
channels C is formed by coupling a channel name with a
user name, and it is ranged over by ar,bs,.... Identiﬁers,
ranged over by u,v,... , denote user names, variables, chan-
nels and compoundentities made up by a channelname and
a variable. The only transmissible values are user names
and channels and are ranged over by m,n,.... Channel
namescannot be transmitted, as they make little sense with-
out the indication of the user owning them. Input channels
cannot be variables and are not decorated with a user name.
This is a syntactic means to localize them, as input chan-
nels implicitlybelongto the user the appearin. On the other
hand,outputactionsmustindicatethe name of the user con-
taining the invoked channel. For example, r{| as ... .P|} ρ
models a user r trying to communicate along channel a as-
sociated to user s (if any). Notice also that a process like
a(x).bx v .P can be accepted but, in order to be executed, at
run-time x must be assigned a user name r which owns an
input channel br. These properties will be enforced by the
type system of Section 2.
Restrictions (νa : R)P and (νar : R)A and the input pre-
ﬁx a(x).P act as binders for channel name a, channelar and
variable x, respectively. Thesets offreeandboundchannels
ina system A, written F(A)andB (A), are deﬁnedaccord-
ingly, and so is alpha-conversion. Just notice that (νa:R)P
within user r binds channel ar. The formal deﬁnition of
free and bound channels is in the full paper [3]; here we
assume that systems are closed (i.e. with no free variables),
that bound channels are pairwise distinct and diﬀerent from
the free ones. Furthermore, observe that user names cannot
be restricted. This seems reasonable since the creation of a
new user is a sensitive operation: it has to be performed by
the system administrator, as it may aﬀect the RBAC policy
underlying the entire system.
In this paper, we denote with  a possibly empty tuple
of entities of kind . Moreover, we write  ar :  R to denote
the tuple {ar
1 : R1,...,ar
k : Rk},f o rk ≥ 0. Sometimes, we
shall use tuples as sets (i.e. withoutconsideringthe orderof
their elements) and we write, e.g., bs ∈  ar or bs : S ∈  ar :  R.
1.2 Dynamic Semantics
The dynamics of the calculus is given in the form of a
reductionrelation. Ascustomary,thereductionsemanticsis
based on an auxiliary relation called structural congruence,
≡, which brings the participants of a potential interaction to
contiguous positions.
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Structural Congruence). The structural
congruence relation, ≡, is the least congruence on systems
which equates alpha-convertible systems, makes   and |
commutative and associative with identities respectively 0
and nil, and satisﬁes the following laws.
r{| P | Q|}ρ ≡ r{| P|}ρ   r{| Q|}ρ
r{| (νa:R)P|}ρ ≡ (νar:R)r{| P|} ρ
(νar:R)(νbs:S)A ≡ (νbs:S)(νar:R)A
(νar:R)A   B ≡ (νar:R)(A   B)i f ar  F(B)
r{| !P|}ρ ≡ r{| P |!P|}ρ
r{| [u = u]P|}ρ ≡ r{| P|}ρ
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Reduction Relation). The reduction rela-
tion,  −→, is the least relation on systems satisfying the fol-
lowing laws.
r{| a(x).P|}ρ   s{| ar n .Q|} ρ   −→ r{| P[n/x] |}ρ   s{| Q|}ρ 
r{| roleR.P|} ρ  −→ r{| P|}ρ∪{R}
r{| yieldR.P|} ρ  −→ r{| P|}ρ−{R}
A  −→ A 
A   B  −→ A    B
A  −→ A 
(νar:R)A  −→ (νar:R)A 
A ≡ A  A   −→ B  B  ≡ B
A  −→ B
All structural rules are standard, but the ﬁrst two. The
ﬁrst states that a session of user r with rˆ oles ρ hosting two
processes running in parallel can be split in two parallel
sessions of r with rˆ oles ρ. The second one states that a
restriction of a channel name inside a user can be turned
into a restriction over the corresponding channel at the sys-
tem level. Similarly, the reduction relation is an extension
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ﬁrst action adds R to the rˆ oles ρ activated in the current
session, while the second one removes R from ρ. Notice
that, by exploiting the ﬁrst structural rule and the rules for
role/yield, the user r{| roleR.P | yieldS.Q|} ρ evolves into
r{| P|}ρ∪{R}   r{| Q|}ρ−{S},i . e .a c t i o n srole/yieldonly aﬀect the
process thread executing them.
1.3 RBAC Schema
To conclude the presentation of the RBAC96 model, we
need to deﬁne the RBAC schema, i.e., the rˆ oles-to-users
and permissions-to-rˆ oles associations, where permissions
enable the actions a user can perform within a system.
Managing rˆ oles and their interrelationships is a diﬃcult
andsensitive task that is oftencentralizedanddelegatedto a
smallteamofsecurityadministrators. Inourframework,the
RBAC schema consists of a pair of ﬁnite relations (U;P),
whereU assignsrˆ olesto users,while Passignspermissions
to rˆ oles. More formally,
U⊆ ﬁn (Nu ∪C ) ×R P⊆ ﬁn R×A
where A  {R↑,R?,R!}R∈R represents the set of performable
actions. Intuitively, permission R↑ determines the possibil-
ity to activate rˆ ole R (via the action role), while permissions
R? and R! determine the possibility of performing input and
outputactions over a channelof rˆ ole R, respectively. Notice
that permissions over input/output actions are not deﬁned
in terms of channels, but of channel rˆ oles. In this way, we
are ﬂexible enough to model both the permission to com-
municate over a single channel (when the relation U maps
only one channel to a rˆ ole), and the permission to commu-
nicate over the member of a group of channels (when re-
lation U maps more than one channel to the same rˆ ole).
Such a case may be useful in situations where more chan-
nels can handle the same kind of requests (cf. Example 1
for a possible situation). Observe that, if U assigns rˆ ole R
to a channel, then the permissions assigned to R by P are
irrelevant;that is, P matters only for users. Moreover,since
channels can be considered as methods provided by users,
it seems reasonable that each channel is assigned only one
rˆ ole. A RBAC schema satisfying this last requirement is
called well-deﬁned; in the following we shall only consider
well-deﬁned RBAC schemata. Observe that in A no per-
mission represents actions yield. Indeed, we assume that a
rˆ ole can be deactivated if (and only if) it has been activated
before.
To conclude the presentation of our language, we now
give a couple of examples using the features introduced so
far. We use the following notational conventions. We use
as a generic placeholder,and write U( ) to denote the set of
all rˆ oles R such that ( ,R) ∈U ; we call the left projection
of U its domain, and proceed analogously for P. Finally,
we let P(ρ) mean

R∈ρ P(R).
Example 1. Let us now formalize in our framework a sce-
nario where a bank client is waiting to be served by one of
the branch cashiers available. There are two users, r and
s, representing respectively the client and the bank branch,
while cashiers are modeled as channels belonging to user
s, named c1,...,cn.T h e r ˆ oles available are client and
cashier. Relation U assigns rˆ ole client to user r and
cashier to channels ci, while P assigns to client the
permission to communicate with any of the cashiers, i.e.,
(client, cashier!) ∈P .I n t h i s w a y , r can indistinctly
activate any of the cashier methods. The overall system can
be described as follows (where we use Π as a shorthand for
parallel composition):
r{| roleclient.enqueues r .dequeue(z).
z req1 .···.z reqk .z stop .yieldclient|} ρ  
s{| (νfree : scheduling)(
!enqueue(x).free(y).dequeuex y |Πn
i=1frees cs
i |
Πn
i=1 !ci(x).(
[x = withdrw req] handle withdraw request |
[x = dep req] handle deposit request | ...|
[x = stop]free
s cs
i )) |}ρ 
Once the client enters the bank (i.e., she activates rˆ ole
client), she queues up and waits to be served. When one
of the cashiers becomes available (information maintained
internally by the bank via the reserved channel free used for
cashiers’ scheduling), the client is notiﬁed and can make
requests along the received channel z. Cashiers repeatedly
receiverequests; weassumemethodstohandlemoneywith-
draw and deposit (for simplicity, we do not consider the or-
der in which clients arrive; a system of queues can however
be added routinely).
Example 2 (Prerequisite rˆ ole). In some circumstances,
one may want to require a rˆ ole to be activated only
by a user already playing a certain rˆ ole. This is a
particular model of constrained RBAC called prerequi-
site rˆ ole (see, e.g., [17]). In the banking scenario
of Example 1, imagine that r is member of rˆ oles
client, user and authenticated user, and that the
bank policy requires a preliminary authentication phase
to identify its clients. This can be implemented by
having (authenticated user, client↑) ∈P ; hence
authenticated user must be present in ρ to enable the
evolution of r given above.
Example 2 shows that some form of ‘default’ rˆ ole may be
needed to kick-start users’ activities. Hence, ρ in r{| P|}ρ is
used both to record the rˆ oles activated in the session and to
assign some default rˆ oles to r at the outset.
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(T-I1)
Γ( ) = ρ[ a :  C] ∈N u ∪V
Γ   : ρ[ a :  C]
(T-I2)
Γ( ) = ρ[ b :  C,a : C,  b  :  C ] ∈N u ∪V
Γ   a : C
Typing Processes:
(T-I)
Γ   ar: R(T) R?∈P (ρ) Γ, x : T;ρ  P
r P
Γ;ρ  P
r a(x).P
(T-O)
Γ   u: R(T) Γ   v: TR !∈P (ρ) Γ;ρ  P
r P
Γ;ρ  P
r u v .P
(T-Rˆ )
Γ   r : ρ [ a :  C] R∈ ρ  R↑∈P (ρ) Γ;ρ ∪{ R}  P
r P
Γ;ρ  P
r roleR.P
(T-Y)
R ∈ ρ Γ;ρ −{ R} 
P
r P
Γ;ρ  
P
r yieldR.P
(T-N)
Γ;ρ  
P
r nil
(T-P)
Γ;ρ  P
r P Γ;ρ  P
r Q
Γ;ρ  P
r P | Q
(T-B)
Γ;ρ  P
r P
Γ;ρ  P
r !P
(T-M)
Γ;ρ  P
r P
Γ;ρ  P
r [u = v]P
(T-R)
Γ,ar: R(T);ρ  P
r P
Γ;ρ  P
r (νa:R)P
Typing Systems:
(T-E)
Γ  P 0
(T-S)
Γ   r : ρ [ a :  C] ρ ⊆ ρ  Γ;ρ  P
r P
Γ  P r{| P|}ρ
(T-SP)
Γ  
P A Γ  
P B
Γ  
P A   B
(T-SR)
Γ,ar: R(T)  P A
Γ  P (νar:R)A
Table 2. Typing Rules
2 Static Semantics
The type system described below providesstatic guaran-
tees that the set of actions performedby any user during the
computationrespects the RBAC schema, given an initial set
ρ of activated rˆ oles. The syntax of types can be deﬁned by
the following productions (recall that  denotes a possibly
empty tuple of entities of kind )
Message Types T ::= ρ[ a :  C] | C
Channel Types C ::= R(T)
Type ρ[a1 : R1(T1),...,an : Rn(Tn)] can be assigned to a
user r belonging to rˆ oles in ρ and owning channels  ar ordi-
nately of type  R(T). Type R(T) can be assigned to channels
exchanging values of type T and belonging to rˆ ole R.
A typing environment Γ is a ﬁnite partial mapping from
Nu ∪Vinto types; thus we write Γ( ) = T to refer to the
typeT oftheusernameorv ariable . Atypingenvironment
can be extended as follows:
Γ, x : T  Γ  {x : T}
Γ,ar : C  Γ 
where
Γ
 (s) =

Γ(s)i f s  r
ρ[a : C, b :  C]i f s = r, a  b,
and Γ(r) = ρ[ b :  C]
In the rest of the paper, we denote with   the union of func-
tions/relationswith disjointdomains. A typingenvironment
Γ can be used to type a system under a schema (U;P) only
if the rˆ ole information in Γ respects the associations in U.
This intuition is formalized by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Given a RBAC schema (U;P) and a typ-
ing environment Γ, we say that Γ respects U if, for all
r ∈ dom(Γ) with Γ(r) = ρ[a1 : R1(T1),...,an : Rn(Tn)],
it holds that U(r) = ρ and U(ar
i) = {Ri},f o ra l li = 1,...,n.
The primary judgments of the type system are of the
form Γ  P A, that should be read as “the system A is well-
formed with respect to environmentΓ and relation P”. This
fact, together with the requirement that Γ respects U,i m -
plies that A respects the RBAC schema (U;P). To infer the
mainjudgment,we relyontwo auxiliaryjudgments,onefor
identiﬁers and one for processes. Judgment Γ   u : T states
that the identiﬁer u has type T in Γ; judgment Γ;ρ  P
r P
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r with rˆ oles ρ activated.
The typing rules are collected in Table 2. Most of them
are self-explanatory; we comment below the most signiﬁ-
cant ones, i.e. those related to the actions in our calculus.
The underlyingidea beyondthese rules is that an action can
be executed only if the current session has activated a rˆ ole
enabling the action. Rule (T-I) states that, for typing
a(x).P in a session of r where rˆ oles ρ are activated, we need
to establish that ar has type R(T)i nΓ, that inputs over a
channel of group R can be performed when playing rˆ oles
ρ and that P is typeable once assumed that x has type T.
Rule (T-O) is similar: it checks that an output over
a channel of group R is allowed when rˆ oles in ρ are acti-
vated. Moreover, it also requires that the transmitted value
v can be assigned type T in Γ.R u l e( T - R ˆ ) states that for
typing process roleR.P in a session of r where rˆ oles ρ are
activated, we need to check that r can assume rˆ ole R,t h a tρ
enablesthe activation and that P is typeable for r having ac-
tivated ρ ∪{ R}.R u l e( T - Y ) states that process yieldR.P
is legal for r only when R has been previously activated and
if P is typeable for r when R is oﬀ.
Finally, notice that in rules (T-R) and (T-SR)t h e
type of the restricted channelis not tracked in the restriction
construct. Indeed, for typechecking purposes, it suﬃces to
ensure that the new channel is used coherently by all the
processes accessing it. To this aim, we only need to invent
a suitable T when applying the rules and verify that all the
accesses to the channel conform to T.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Well-typedness). Given a RBAC schema
(U;P) and a system A, we say that A is well-typed for
(U;P) if there exists a typing environment Γ respecting U
such that Γ  P A.
We now prove the soundness of the type system in the
standard way, i.e., by proving subject reduction and type
safety,whichensurethatonlysystemsabidingbytheRBAC
schema are allowed (i.e., users performing actions permit-
ted by their duly activated rˆ oles).
Theorem 2.1 (Subject Reduction). If Γ  P A and A  −→
A , then Γ  P A .
Theorem 2.2 (Type Safety). Let A be a well-typed system
for (U;P). Then
1. whenever A ≡ (ν  ar :  R)(A    r{| P|}ρ), it holds that
ρ ⊆U (r)
2. whenever A ≡ (ν  ar:  R)(A    r{| roleR.P|} ρ), it holds
that R ∈U (r) and R↑ ∈P (ρ)
3. whenever A ≡ (ν  ar:  R)(A    r{| yieldR.P|}ρ), it holds
that R ∈ ρ
4. whenever A ≡ (ν  ar: R)(A    r{| b(x).P|}ρ), it holds that
either br: S ∈  ar:  R and S ? ∈P (ρ),o rb r   ar and
S ? ∈P (ρ), where {S} = U(br)
5. whenever A ≡ (ν  ar:  R)(A    r{| bs n .P|} ρ), it holds
that either bs:S ∈  ar: R and S ! ∈P (ρ),o rb s   ar and
S ! ∈P (ρ), where {S} = U(bs)
Example 3. Let us consider again the banking scenario
described in Example 1. To illustrate the type system in-
troduced above, let us give a possible typing for the sys-
tem. Let Tcsh  cashier({request}[]) be the type of the
cashiers, i.e., channels belonging to rˆ ole cashier and ex-
changing values of type {request}[]. Type {request}[]
represents the possible requests of clients; syntactically,
values of this type are names of users belonging to rˆ ole
request which do not provide any channel. Moreover, we
let
Tcl  (ρ ∪{ client})[dequeue : cashier get(Tcsh)]
be the type of r. This represents users belonging to rˆ oles in
ρ∪{client} and owning a channel named dequeue of type
cashier get(Tcsh). Then, a suitable typing environmentΓ
is
r  → Tcl
s  → ρ
 [enqueue : cashier req(Tcl),
c1 : Tcsh,...,cn : Tcsh]
withdrw req  →{ request}[]
dep req  →{ request}[]
... → ...
stop  →{ request}[].
A suitable permissions-to-rˆ olesassignment P is
{cashier req!,
cashier get?,cashier!}⊆P (client);
{client↑}⊆P (ρ);
A ∪{ cashier req
?,
scheduling?,scheduling!,
cashier get!,cashier?}⊆P (ρ );
where A ⊆Ais a set of action permissions that allow the
handling of client’s requests. The system of Example 1 is
well-typed for any schema (U,P) such that Γ respects U.
Example 4. In the real world, it is unrealistic to allow any
bank client to ask for any kind of bank operation. For in-
stance, when a client applies for credit, she is always asked
for some credentials. To model this ﬁner scenario, we let
eachavailableoperationtobemodeledasa speciﬁcmethod,
which can be activated through a speciﬁc channel (e.g.,
channelwdrw handleswithdrawrequests, opnhandlesopen
account requests, cc handles credit card requests, etc.). The
communication along diﬀerent channels requires diﬀerent
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client. In this setting, the cashier ci of Example 1 is imple-
mented by the following process (the remaining behaviour
of the bank is implemented as in Example 1):
ci(x).([x = withdrw req]wdrw(y)....|
[x = open req]opn(y)....|
[x = creditcard req]cc(y)....| ...|
[x = stop]frees cs
i  )
Let relation U assign channel wdrw (respectively, opn
and cc) the group wdrw (respectively, opn and cc), and
P = { (rich client,cc!), (client,wdrw!), (user,opn!),
(user,client↑), (rich,rich client↑) }. Thus, under
this schema, the client
r{| roleclient.enqueues r .dequeue(z).z creditcard req .
ccs signature .z stop .yieldclient|} {user}
is not well-typed because she has not activated the correct
rˆ ole for performing credit card requests. Indeed, the type-
checking fails when applying the rule (T-O) to action
ccs signature  because cc!  P({user,client}). On the
other hand, the following clients do type-check:
r1{| rolerich client.enqueues r .dequeue(z).
z creditcard req .ccs signature .z stop | } {rich} ;
r2{| roleclient.enqueues r .dequeue(z).z withdrw req .
wdrws sum .z stop | } {user} ;
r3{| enqueues r .dequeue(z).z open req .
opns personal data .z stop | }{user} .
We conclude this section remarkingthat our type system
is not powerful enough to type all legal systems. For exam-
ple, the absence of a recursive type constructor makes the
system r{| ar r | } ρ untypeable. Recursive types can be stan-
dardly handled as in [15]. Similarly, we have no notion of
subtyping. Thus, a channel must always carry values ex-
actly of the same type. By introducing standard π calculus
subtyping (see e.g. [16, 18]), a more liberal typing disci-
pline can be developed in a standard way. For the sake of
simplicity, here we preferred to focus on the core character-
istics needed in our setting.
3 Observational Semantics
Often,theoverallstructureofadistributedsystemcannot
be known statically. Thus, the typing approach described
in the previous section, even if interesting from a theoret-
ical point of view, may not be usable in practice. In this
section, we introduce a labeled transition system (LTS, for
short) which embodies dynamic policy checks, and allows
us to study (not necessarily well-typed)system components
in isolation and compositionally. The LTS also provides
a tight operational model for the minimal engine underly-
ing any implementation of a RBAC-based run-time system.
We deﬁne a standard bisimulation over the LTS and show
that it is adequate with a typed barbed congruence, a rele-
vant result in at least two respects. Firstly, it signiﬁes that
our bisimulation is a sensible equivalence to consider, as it
agrees with the (typed) contextual semantics derived from
an elementary, natural class of observables. Secondly, it
provides us with a powerful co-inductive proof technique
for barbed congruence.
The standard way to describe the interactions a system
can oﬀer externally is by labeling the system evolution with
this information. Thus, we deﬁne a labeled transition sys-
tem,
µ
− − → , that makes apparent the action performed (and,
thus, the external interaction oﬀered). Since we do not re-
quire
µ
− − → to act only on well-typed terms, the LTS comes
equipped with runtime checks with respect to the RBAC
schema considered to block the execution of illegal actions.
The LTS evolves from the π calculus’ early-style transi-
tion system. In order to account for systems’ rˆ oles vary-
ing over time, the LTS relates conﬁgurations,i . e .p a i r s
(U;P)   A made up of a RBAC schema (U;P) and a sys-
tem A. Conﬁgurations are ranged over by D,E . The labels
of the LTS are derived from those of the π calculus and can
be described as follows.
µ ::= τ | a
rn | a
rn : R | arn | arn : R
Label τ represents an internal computation of the system.
Labels arn and arn describe the intention to send/receive
value n, known to the environment, on/from channel ar.
Labels arn : R and arn : R are similar to but the value
sent/received is ‘fresh’ (i.e. unknown to the environment)
and has group R. Functions F( )a n dB ( ) are easily ex-
tended to labels. In particular, bs is the bound channel of µ
whenever µ is either arbs : R or arbs : R; free channels are
deﬁned accordingly.
The rules deﬁning
µ
− − → are given in Table 3. The over-
all structure of the system is similar to π calculus’ (see,
e.g., [18]). We use rules (LTS-S), (LTS-E), (LTS-
M), (LTS-B) and the symmetric versions of rules
(LTS-C), (LTS-P) and (LTS-C)t oa v o i ds t r u c -
turalcongruence;however,westill implicitlyassumealpha-
conversion. The premises of rules (LTS-K-I), (LTS-F-
I), (LTS-O), (LTS-Rˆ ) and (LTS-Y) adapt
respectively the premises of the typing rules (T-I), (T-
O), (T-Rˆ )and(T-Y), andblockthe evolutionof
ill-typed systems. Rule (LTS-K-I) can be applied when
the received value is known to the schema, while (LTS-
F-I) is used when a fresh value (i.e. unknown to the
schema) is received. In this case, the schema is extended to
record the group of the fresh value. Similarly, when extrud-
ing a restricted channel bs,r u l e( L T S - O ) enlarges the
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R ∈U (r) R↑∈P (ρ)
(U;P)   r{| roleR.P|}ρ
τ
− → (U;P)   r{| P|}ρ∪{R}
(LTS-Y)
R ∈ ρ
(U;P)   r{| yieldR.P|} ρ
τ
− → (U;P)   r{| P|}ρ−{R}
(LTS-K-I)
U(a
r) = {R} R
? ∈P (ρ) n ∈ dom(U)
(U;P)   r{| a(x).P|}ρ
arn
− −−→ (U;P)   r{| P[n/x] |} ρ
(LTS-O)
U(a
s) = {R} R
! ∈P (ρ)
(U;P)   r{| as n .P|}ρ
asn
− −−→ (U;P)   r{| P|}ρ
(LTS-C)
(U;P)   A
arn
− −−→ (U;P)   A  (U;P)   B
arn
− −−→ (U;P)   B 
(U;P)   A   B
τ
− → (U;P)   A    B 
(LTS-F-I)
U(ar) = {R} R? ∈P (ρ) n  dom(U)
(U;P)   r{| a(x).P|}ρ
arn:S
− −−−− → (U { n : S};P)   r{| P[n/x] |}ρ
(LTS-O)
(U { bs:S};P)   A
arbs
− −−− → (U { bs:S};P)   A  ar bs
(U;P)   (νbs:S)A
arbs:S
− −−−−→ (U { bs:S};P)   A 
(LTS-C)
(U;P)   A
arbs:S
− −−−−→ (U ;P)   A  (U;P)   B
arbs:S
− −−−−→ (U ;P)   B  bs  F(A)
(U;P)   A   B
τ
− → (U;P)   (νbs:S)(A    B )
(LTS-R)
(U { ar:R};P)   A
µ
− − → (U   { ar:R};P)   A  ar  F(µ)
(U;P)   (νar:R)A
µ
− − → (U ;P)   (νar:R)A 
(LTS-P)
(U;P)   A
µ
− − → (U
 ;P)   A
  B(µ) ∩ F(B) = ∅
(U;P)   A   B
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A    B
(LTS-E)
(U;P)   (νar:R)r{| P|} ρ
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A
(U;P)   r{| (νa:R)P|} ρ
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A
(LTS-S)
(U;P)   r{| P|}ρ   r{| Q|}ρ
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A
(U;P)   r{| P | Q|}ρ
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A
(LTS-M)
(U;P)   r{| P|}ρ
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A
(U;P)   r{| [u = u]P|}ρ
µ
− − → (U
 ;P)   A
(LTS-B)
(U;P)   r{| P |!P|}ρ
µ
− − → (U ;P)   A
(U;P)   r{| !P|}ρ
µ
− − → (U
 ;P)   A
plus the symmetric version of rules of (LTS-P), (LTS-C) and (LTS-C)
Table 3. A Labeled Transition System
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bs has the rˆ ole declared in the restriction. The information
about a fresh/extruded channel is deleted from the schema
when the channel is communicated: indeed, the restriction
is pushed back in the system and closes the scope of the
channel – cf. rule (LTS-C). Notice that a bound output
can synchronize only with a fresh input (and vice versa),
and the rˆ ole declared for the extruded/fresh channel must
be the same. Also observe that τ-moves do not modify the
schema (U;P).
The semantics given in Deﬁnition 1.2 and the LTS just
presented are related by the following
Proposition 3.1. If (U;P)   A
τ
− → (U;P)   A , we have
A  −→ A . Also, if A is well-typed for (U;P), then A  −→ A 
implies (U;P)   A
τ
− → (U;P)   B, for some B ≡ A .
Next, we build upon this LTS a standard bisimulation. As
usual, = ⇒ denotes the reﬂexive and transitive closure of
τ
− → ,a n d
µ
= = ⇒ denotes = ⇒
µ
− − →= ⇒ . Finally,
ˆ µ
= = ⇒ is = ⇒ if
µ = τ,a n d
µ
= = ⇒ otherwise.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Bisimilarity). A bisimulation is a binary
symmetric relation S between conﬁgurations such that, if
(D,E) ∈Sand D
µ
− − → D , there exists a conﬁguration E 
such that E
ˆ µ
= = ⇒ E  and (D ,E ) ∈S . Bisimilarity, ≈,i st h e
largest bisimulation.
As often happens in typed calculi, ≈ is not a congru-
ence for all system contexts. Indeed, due to the checks in
the LTS for schema compliance, the application of ill-typed
contexts can break equivalences. Consider for instance
A  r{| a(x).br ·  | ar · |}ρ and B  0,w h e nar  dom(U),
U(br) = {R} and R?,R! ∈P (ρ). Then (U;P)   A ≈
(U;P)   B but (U;P)   (νar:R)A  ≈ (U;P)   (νar:R)B.
A similar problem arises if U(ar) = {S} but S ?,S !  P(ρ).
Moreover, some care must be paid when the conﬁgurations
equated rely on diﬀerent schemata. Indeed, it is easy to ﬁnd
a situation where (U1;P1)   A1 ≈ (U2;P2)   A2 but
(U1;P1)   A1   B  ≈ (U2;P2)   A2   B:i ts u ﬃces to ﬁnd a
system B with an action enabled by P1 but disabled by P2.
Theorem 3.2 (Congruence Properties of ≈). The follow-
ing facts hold:
1. if (U1;P1)   A1 ≈ (U2;P2)   A2 and (U1;P1)   B ≈
(U2;P2)   B, then (U1;P1)   A1   B ≈ (U2;P2)  
A2   B;
2. if (U1  { ar:R};P1)   A1 ≈ (U2  {ar:R};P2)   A2,
then (U1;P1)   (νar:R)A1 ≈ (U2;P2)   (νar:R)A2.
Bisimulation is a sound semantic equivalence, in the
sense that it produces no unreasonable equations. To sub-
stantiate this claim, we prove its adequacy for a standardly
deﬁned typed observational congruence, viz. the reduction
barbed congruence [11]. This is a touchstone equivalence
deﬁned in terms of the reduction relation and of a notion
of observability, and then closed under all possible system
contexts. The reason to consider a typed congruence is that
only well-typed contexts guarantee a reduction behaviour
abiding by the RBAC policy. Indeed, the reduction rela-
tion performs none of the legality checks hard-coded in the
LTS. Hence, the right frameworkfor comparisonof ≈ and a
barbed congruence is a typed one.
In its typedversion, barbedcongruenceis tagged with an
environment Γ and a permissions-to-rˆ oles assignment P,t o
signify that its equationsare typeable underΓ and P.M o r e -
over, only contexts typeable under Γ and P are considered
in the deﬁnition of congruence. Thus, following the style
of [9], we write Γ |=P A1  A2 to mean that Γ  P Ai for
i = 1,2a n dt h a tA1 and A2 exhibit the same behaviour in all
environment ‘compatible’ with Γ and P.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Barbs). The observation predicate A ↓ η
holds if either η = ar and A ≡ (ν  bs:  R)(A    r{| a(x).P|}ρ)
for ar   bs,o rη = arand A ≡ (ν  bs:  R)(A    s {| ar n .P|}ρ)
forar   bs. Thepredicate A ⇓ η holdsif thereexists A = ⇒ A 
such that A  ↓ η.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Reduction Barbed Congruence). Reduc-
tion barbed congruence is the largest binary and symmetric
typed relation over systems such that the following proper-
ties hold whenever Γ |=P A1  A2.
1. Barb Preserving: if A1 ↓ η,t h e nA2 ⇓ η
2. Reduction Closed: if A1  −→ A 
1, then there exists a
system A 
2 such that A2 = ⇒ A 
2 and Γ |=P A 
1  A 
2
3. Contextual:
(a) for all P  and u:  T such that Γ, u:  T is deﬁned, it
holds that Γ, u:  T |=P∪P 
A1  A2
(b) for all systems B such that Γ  P B it holds that
Γ |=P A1   B  A2   B ;
(c) for all ar : R(T) such that Γ=Γ  ,ar : R(T), it
holds that Γ  |=P (νar:R)A1  (νar:R)A2.
Before comparing ≈ and , we remark that the chosen
barbs only express the ability to interact over channels. In-
deed, observing rˆ ole activations/deactivationsis not reason-
able, as no context can determinewhether a user performsa
role/yield: these operations only aﬀect the thread perform-
ing them.
The fact that ≈ approximates onlyholdsfor well-typed
conﬁgurations, i.e. conﬁgurations (U;P)   A such that A
is well-typed for (U;P). Given a typing environmentΓ,w e
let UΓ be the rˆ oles-to-users assignment extracted from Γ,
that is the least assignment such that, for any association r :
ρ[ a :  R(T)] in Γ, it holds that UΓ(r) = ρ and UΓ(ar) = {R}
for any a : R(T) ∈ a :  R(T).
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(UΓ;P)   A ≈ (UΓ;P)   B then Γ |=P A  B.
Theorem 3.3 shows that ≈ is a sound proof-technique for
barbed congruence. However, while the former is relatively
easy to use, the latter is very hard to handle because of the
contextual closure requirement. We leave as a future work
the development of ﬁner techniques (as e.g. in [8, 14]) to
prove the converse of Theorem 3.3, i.e. that bisimilarity is
complete for barbed congruence.
To conclude, we now list some algebraic laws that illus-
tratetheimpactofRBAContheπcalculus. Inwhatfollows,
weﬁx aRBAC schema(U;P). Theﬁrst equationstates that
a terminated session of a user does not aﬀect the evolution
of a system. Indeed, it holds that
r{| nil|} ρ ≈ 0.
This is diﬀerent from some distributed calculi, like e.g. the
Ambient calculus [5], where the presence of a user is rele-
vant. Moreover, by letting α to range over action preﬁxes
(i.e. inputs/outputs and role/yield), it holds that
r{| α.P|}ρ ≈ 0
whenever α is not legal for a session r{| · |}ρ with respect
to the RBAC schema, that is if the premises of rules
(LTS-Rˆ ), (LTS-Y), (LTS-K-I), (LTS-F-I)
and (LTS-O) are not satisﬁed. This law stresses that
LTS and types both enforce the same requirements (com-
parethe runtimechecksofthe LTS with Theorem2.2). Asa
consequence, the following law diﬀerentiates our language
from the π calculus. Indeed, it holds that
(νa
r:R)(r{| a(x).P|}ρ   s{| a
r n .Q|} ρ ) ≈ 0,
if and only if R?  P(ρ)o rR!  P(ρ ).
Diﬀerently from several distributed languages, the user
performing an output action is irrelevant. The only relevant
aspect is the set of permissions activated when performing
the action. This is summarized in the following law:
r{| bs n .nil|}ρ ≈ t{| bs n .nil|}ρ.
Asimilar lawholdsfor the yieldaction. On the contrary,re-
locating an input action usually breaks the equivalence be-
tween processes. In particular, we have
r{| a(x).P|}ρ  ≈ t{| a(x).P|}ρ
unless both input actions are disabled (in which case both
systems are equivalent to 0). Similarly, it is possible to
migrate a roleR preﬁx between two users only when R is
assigned to both or to none of them. By exploiting these
observations, we can ﬁnd a relocation procedure to mini-
mize the number of users in a system, while maintaining
the system overall behaviour, as it will be described in the
next section.
4 Applications
In this section, we exploit the theory developed so far
in three non-trivial applications of the RBAC model. The
ﬁrstdealswith the problemof ﬁndingthe ‘minimal’schema
which makes a given system legal. The second is somehow
symmetric: given a schema and a system, we aim at ar-
ranging role/yield operations within the system so that the
resulting system can be executed with respect to the given
schema (if possible). Finally, we give a simple but eﬃcient
procedure to determine whether a process can be executed
by diﬀerent users without compromising the functionality
of the system. This can be useful to minimize the number
of users in a system, while maintaining the overall system
behaviour.
Minimal Schema. Let A be a system well-typed for a
RBAC schema(U;P). Potentially,thereareinﬁnitelymany
schemata under which the system can run correctly; thus, it
seems reasonable to look for a ‘minimal’ such. This would
make the execution/veriﬁcation of systems more eﬃcient
bothin space and time: the storage of the schema is reduced
in size, thus any query to the schema can be replied faster.
We deﬁne the set of conﬁgurations for A as CONFA =
{(U ;P )   A | (U ;P )i saR B A Cs c h e m a }. Even if po-
tentially inﬁnite, the relevant part of CONFA can be eﬀec-
tively built up by considering only the rˆ oles and identiﬁers
occurring in the system A. We now partition CONFA with
respect to ≈ and consider the equivalence class containing
(U;P)   A, called CONF
(U;P)
A . By ﬁxing a metrics over
schemata, the minimal schema to run the system A will be
a minimal element of CONF
(U;P)
A .
Clearly, the existence of such a minimal element and the
way in which it is chosen depend on a chosen metrics.F o r
example,one can consideras a goodmetrics the value|U|+
|P|, i.e., the size of the schema expressed in terms of the
number of couples forming the relations U and P.I nt h i s
case, a minimal schema always exists. Other metrics could
be based on the number of rˆ oles used to deﬁne the schema,
on the weight of the permissions associated to some users
(once assumed a weight function to discriminate powerful
permissions from common ones), on the average number of
permissions associated to each rˆ ole, and so on.
Notice that in general A may not be well-typed under
the minimal schema. This is because the static typing pro-
cedure over-approximates the behaviour of a system (e.g.,
it also considers unreachable code and connot type all le-
gal systems, as described at the end of Section 2). The
bisimulation-based approach presented here is more accu-
rate since it only considers the eﬀective behaviour of the
system. Thus,the schemaobtainedin thiswaydescribesthe
minimal requirements a schema should satisfy to run (and
not to type) system A, while maintainingthe behaviourof A
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Reﬁning Systems to make them Executable. Usually,
the task of properly putting role/yield operations within a
system is tedious and error-prone; moreover, it assumes a
full knowledge of the RBAC schema at programming time.
We now describea way to addrˆ ole activations/deactivations
within a system in such a way that the resulting system can
be executed under a given schema, whenever possible. No-
tice that, given a RBAC schema (U;P) and a system A
without actions role/yield, we can simply reﬁne A in a sys-
tem A  by activating at the beginning of each session of a
(generic) user r all the rˆ oles in U(r). Intuitively, A  con-
tains all the legal behaviors of A with respect to the RBAC
schema given. However, the fact that all the rˆ oles assigned
to a user are always activated violates a basilar RBAC de-
sign principle: a rˆ ole should be active only when needed. In
the following, we give a procedure to reﬁne this approach
and obtain a system closer to the RBAC design principles.
Let   R denote a possibly empty,orderedsequenceof rˆ oles
and role   R (resp. yield   R) denote roleR1.···.roleRn (resp.
yieldR1.···.yieldRn) whenever   R = R1,···,Rn.T h e r e -
ﬁning procedure replaces any input/output preﬁx α oc-
curring in session r{ |···| } ρ with the sequence of preﬁxes
role   R.α.yield   R where   R is formed by rˆ oles that r can ac-
tivate when holding ρ, and that enable the execution of α.1
Moreover, since there are in principle several such   R,w e
choose one of the shortests, i.e. a sequence containing the
minimum number of elements. Let ena(Γ,P,r,ρ) denote a
function which returns a shortest sequence of rˆ oles   R such
that Γ;ρ  P
r role   R.a(x).nil, and is undeﬁned if no such se-
quenceexists. Functionen¯ u(Γ,P,r,ρ)is similar,but forout-
puts over u. The reﬁning procedure adapts the type system
presented in Section 2; as an example, the following rule
adapts (T-I).
Γ   a
r: R(T) ena(Γ,P,ρ,r) =   S Γ, x : T;ρ  
P
r P   P
 
Γ;ρ  P
r a(x).P   role   S.a(x).yield   S.P 
The typing rules of Table 2 are adapted accordingly. Of
course,whendealingwith outputpreﬁxes,we useen¯ u rather
than ena. Functions en (...) can be easily calculated by re-
ducingthe problemtoa breathﬁrst searchin a directacyclic
graph (cf. the full paper [3]).
The soundness of the modiﬁed judgment Γ  P A   A 
now follows easily.
Proposition 4.1. Let (U;P) be a RBAC schema and Γ a
typing environment respecting U. Then, Γ  P A implies
that Γ  P A   A, while Γ  P A   A  implies that Γ  P A .
1Several optimizations can of course be introduced to reduce the num-
ber of role/yield. For example, roleR.a(x).yieldR.roleS.b(y).yieldS.P
can be simpliﬁed in roleR.a(x).b(x).yield R.P, whenever rˆ ole R enables
inputs from both a and b. In general, such optimizations require compli-
cated algorithms that we leave for future work.
To conclude, notice that there are other possible ways to
ﬁnd rˆ ole sequences enabling inputs/outputs. For example,
we can enforce the least privilege property. A system satis-
ﬁes such a property if, whenever it performsan action, only
the minimal set of permissions enabling the action are acti-
vated in the correspondingsession. The approachpresented
above can be adapted to such requirements. The main
change aﬀects how functions en (...) are calculated, as the
metrics to minimize is now |P(  R)| rather than |  R|. Thus,
the graph used to calculate these functions is weighted and
records the number of permissions the activation of R adds
to the current session’s permissions. The best   R is then ex-
tracted by using a minimal path algorithm.
Relocating Activities. We now investigate another appli-
cation of our theory, viz. the transfer of a process from a
user to another, which can be useful in order to minimize
the number of users in a system. Balancing users’ activity
can also have a relevant economical impact: in a corpora-
tion, the management usually tries to raise productivity by
optimizing and reassigning each employee’s workload.
We now give an axiomatic way to infer judgments of the
form
(U;P)   r{| P|}ρ ≈ (U;P)   s{| P|}ρ.
This judgment says that the process P can be executed by r
and s without aﬀecting the overall system behaviour. Thus,
the session r{| P|}ρ can be removed. If no other session of
r is left in the system, then r itself can be removed. The
procedure
U =
P
equates systems under the schema (U;P).
The rules deﬁningit are given in Table 4, and generalize the
equations given at the end of Section 3. We want to remark
that a rule for relocating processes with restricted channels
is missing. Indeed, the interplay between user names, re-
stricted channelnamesandrestrictedchannelsis subtle. For
example, consider the process P  (νa:R)ar as  and try to
run it in users r, s and t. In the ﬁrst case, no transition takes
place; in the second case, a bound output takes place; in
the third case, a free output takes place. Thus, relocating
processes with restrictions breaks equivalences, in general.
As stated by the following Proposition, the procedure
given above is a sound axiomatization for the judgment
(U;P)   r{| P|}ρ ≈ (U;P)   s{| P|}ρ.
Proposition 4.2. If r{| P|} ρ
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ then (U;P)  
r{| P|}ρ ≈ (U;P)   s{| P|}ρ.
5 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study build-
ing on process-calculi has ever been conducted on RBAC.
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U =
P
s{| nil|}ρ
r{| P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ r{| Q|}ρ
U =
P
s{| Q|}ρ
r{| P | Q|}ρ
U =
P
s{| P | Q|}ρ
r{| P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ
r{| !P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| !P|}ρ
r{| P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ
r{| [u = v]P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| [u = v]P|}ρ
r{| P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ
r{| u v .P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| u v .P|}ρ
U(ar) = {R}U (as) = {S}{ R?,S ?}∩P (ρ) = ∅
r{| a(x).P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| a(x).P|}ρ
R  U(r) ∪U(s)
r{| roleR.P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| roleR.P|} ρ
R ∈U (r) ∩U(s) r{| P|}ρ∪{R}
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ∪{R}
r{| roleR.P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| roleR.P|} ρ
R  ρ
r{| yieldR.P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| yieldR.P|} ρ
R ∈ ρ r{| P|}ρ−{R}
U =
P
s{| P|}ρ−{R}
r{| yieldR.P|}ρ
U =
P
s{| yieldR.P|} ρ
Table 4. Relocating Activities
A numberofpapershave insteaddealt with the formalspec-
iﬁcation and veriﬁcation of RBAC schema. In [12, 19] for-
mal methods are used only to verify the correctness of the
schema deﬁnition but not of the whole system. In [19],
the ALLOY language is used to detect possible conﬂicts
in RBAC schemata supporting simultaneously delegation
of authority and separation of duty. A constraint analyzer
allows the schema validation to be computed automati-
cally. In [12, 13], the authors use a graph transformation
whichcombinesan intuitivevisualdescriptionofthe RBAC
schema with solid semantical foundations. Ahn et al. in [1]
introduce a formal language for the speciﬁcation of more
sophisticated role-based authorization constraints, such as
prohibition and obligation constraints. These approaches
are complementary to ours: they can be integrated with our
technique in order to verify the consistency of (U ;P), but
they do not give any hint about the correct execution of a
system as our method does.
In [2], Bertino et al. developa logical frameworkfor rea-
soning about access control models. The framework is gen-
eral enough to model discretionary, mandatory, and role-
based access control models. Such a framework is useful
for comparing the expressive power of the models, but it
cannot be used to verify the correct execution of a system
under a given schema.
Probably, the most related work, although not aiming at
studying RBAC systems, is [4], insofar as rˆ oles can be un-
derstood as (privilege) groups. Groups are introduced in
loc. cit. as types for channels, and used to limit their visi-
bility. A type system ensures that channels belonging to a
fresh group can be only used by processes within the ini-
tial scope of the group. Thus, processes can access chan-
nels according to their physical distribution (with respect to
group restrictions). In our work this feature is modiﬁed so
that not only the place where the process runs (i.e., the user
running the process) but also its execution history (i.e., the
user session where the process runs) is relevant to execute
an action. E.g., outputs over ar of group R can be executed
only by processes whose user r is such that R! ∈P (U(r));
moreover, such an action must be enabled by at least one
of the rˆ oles active in r’s session. The set of such sessions
changes according to the computation and, thus, the pro-
cesses enabled to access a channel change dynamically. In
this sense, this work can be seen as a calculus of dynamic
groups.
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